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also laments the practice of some newspaper publishers who cut advertis-
ing rates in order to take business away from a competitor.
"There can be no question but that public notices from official
sources constitute one of the chief financial props of the so-called country
newspapers in America and this is also true to some extent of the smaller
dailies," says the author, "and if the publisher fails to use every legitimate
means to develop the public notice as a source of revenue for his publica-
tion he stamps himself as an indifferent business man."
On the ground that "there is a vital need for the fullest possible
publicity in governmental affairs" the author urges publishers to insist,
"even to the point of bringing legal action," upon the publication in full
of all mandatory public notices which are now summarized or may have
fallen into disuse, and also to make united efforts to increase the number
of public notices which must be published.
The reader should recognize that the author speaks strictly from the
journalist's standpoint, and should also keep in mind the fact that the
interest of the public in these notices may have a tendency to compel a
modification of the writer's statements. That is, approaching the prob-
lem from the position of a member of the public, with a view to the
particular types of public notices with which he is acquainted, quaere,
what is the necessity for such a notice; how great is its effectiveness;
how may it be clarified, if necessary; in short, what is its general value
to the public? With these queries recurring to the mind as the article
is perused, the discussion will be, it is believed, better appreciated and
reconciled with individual opinions regarding the matter.
ROBERT H. JONES
ROGER B. TANEY, JACKSONIAN JURIST- Charles W. Smith,
Jr. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 1936
Roger B. Taney is probably most widely known as the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court, who gave the decision in the
famous Dred Scott Case. It is unfortunate that he is known primarily
for this. Bad as its reputation has been, even it was a masterpiece of
judicial reasoning. Other decisions of his have been of more lasting
importance. It is to bring out the real of Taney and to wipe the bad
impression of the Dred Scott decision that Charles W. Smith has
written this book.
This is not a biography such as is generally written. It does not pro-
ceed chronologically from birth to death of the central figure. Rather,
Taney's philosophy, character, and mental make-up are analyzed solely
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from his various decisions. Where clarification is needed opinions of his
contemporaries are cited. The vital statistics of Taney's life are given
in the space of a very few pages, in the first section of the book. These
are told in a rather dry and uninteresting fashion. By his own statement,
the author is trying to give a thorough discussion of Taney's political
theory and his contribution to constitutional law. In this, he succeeds
admirably in an interesting and entertaining manner.
Taney came into the national picture just as the pure natural rights
philosophy of the Revolution was becoming a little damped. Taney's
philosophy fitted the times. Not once in his many decisions does he
mention natural rights. He followed generally the philosophy of Rous-
seau rather than that of Locke. Even there he differed in important
respects. He believed that individual rights were "ancient and estab-
lished"; that they were the result of compacts with the government and
did not spring full-blown from nature. In all things the people were
sovereign. Government was their sovereign will expressed in compact
and law. Unless so expressed, there was no natural right, either to
freedom, or to equality, or to hold property.
Smith calls Taney a follower of Jacksonian Democracy. The log-
ical conclusion of Taney's philosophy, however, is that the government
has the power to take away all the rights to which we have become
accustomed. The keynote of Jacksonian Democracy was that certain
rights were inalienable. Even though under Taney's idea it would take
the concerted action of the people to alienate those rights, yet it seems
there is more of a difference between that and Jacksonian Democracy
than Smith implies.
Taney, says the author, considered the constitution as a compact in
which the people agreed that the Federal government should express so
much of their sovereignty as is there set out. Only by their concerted
action can they change that compact. All the rest of the people's sov-
ereignty is vested in the states and they are "absolutely and uncondi-
tionally sovereign" except as limited by the constitution. He realized
that in a monarchy the king, being the epitome of the sovereign will,
could easily enunciate it. In the democracy of the United States, how-
ever, the sovereign will, being shared by all the people, could not so
easily be expressed. He therefore considered the constitution to be that
expression and the Supreme Court to be its interpreter.
Taney believed that every person in the United States was subject
to two governments-the state and the federal. Both exercised powers
of sovereignty. The states, being originally sovereign, retained all sov-
ereignty except that expressly given to the federal government by the
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constitution. Each of these spheres of sovereignty was independent of
the other. When disputes arose as to where one stopped and the other
began, it was the duty of the Supreme Court with the constitution as its
book of rules to decide the controversy.
Having disposed of the philosophy of Justice Taney, the author pro-
ceeds to point out the practical effect of some of his decisions. This he
does in a manner that holds the interest of the reader. He shows how,
in the Charles River Bridge Case, Taney laid the first real foundation
for the police power of the states. Marshall, in the Dartmouth College
Case had said that a charter of the state was a contract that could no
more be broken than could the contract of an individual. The implica-
tions of this would greatly have hampered the state's police power. In
the bridge case a charter had been given to a private company to build a
bridge and charge toll. Later the state wanted to build a free bridge
but by the implication in the charter they could not do it without impair-
ing the right of contract by taking away the benefit given by the charter.
Taney held that the charter was a contract but being one of the state
it must be construed strictly. Since it said nothing about not building
another bridge it could be assumed that in providing for the well-being
of the people, the state had reserved that right. This was the first of
several of the Chief Justice's decisions that built up the police power of
the state.
Smith then discusses Taney and his relation to slavery. While he
doesn't justify the Dred Scott decision in so many words yet he leaves a
definite impression that it was the only thing for Taney to do in the
situation. He shows the criticism of the North, the New York Times
going so far as to compare it with "any decision rendered in any Wash-
ington bar-room." On the other hand he shows the praise it received
in the South.
The author then proceeds to analyze the Chief Justice's concept of
individual rights. During the Mexican War, he relates, a Frenchman
who had been working in Mexico took his small savings and boarded a
vessel for home. The vessel was caught running the blockade and the
government was trying to confiscate as contraband the laborer's total
savings of some $2800. In United States v. Guillem, Taney held that
the wrong of the ship could not be imputed to the individual, that since
his earnings were not cargo they were not subject to confiscation, illus-
trating Taney's feeling for individual rights.
Taney was instrumental in preventing unjust use of governmental
power during war hysteria. In Ex parte Merryman he preserved the
right to the writ of habeas corpus, when John Merryman was awakened
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in the middle of the night and dragged off to prison without explanation.
The idea to which Taney clung was that individual rights under law and
not natural rights were supreme and to be protected from encroach-
ments whether from government or people.
It is doubtful, says Smith iii conclusion, whether actual democracy
in the huge modern state can ever be reached. If no technique can be
developed to make the sovereignty of the people factual then the "demo-
cratic faith of Taney may have to go the way of the flatboats and stage-
coaches which he himself ushered out."
VICTOR A. KETCHAM, JR.
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAw-Buckland and McNair.
Cambridge University Press
"Our interest lies * * * in examining the independent approach of
the two peoples and their lawyers to the same facts of human life, some-
times with widely different, sometimes substantially identical results.
For our belief is that one of the main juridical features of this century
must be a big advance in the comparative study of law."
Thus succinctly stated, the authors set forth both the plan and the
purpose of Roman Law and Common Law. They have done an admir-
able work in their examination of the two basic legal systems and have
gone far toward accomplishing their avowed purpose.
Comparative substantive law is worthy of more attention than it has
been accorded by contemporary legal scholars. Recognizing this need,
Messrs. Buckland and McNair have attempted to compare and contrast
the Roman legal system as it existed in various stages of Roman history,
with the English common law. Their work was facilitated by the fact
that searching treatises have been written concerning each system but
their endeavor to compare and contrast the two bodies of law stands as
a unique work fulfilling an evident need.
The book covers most of the important rubrics of law. The treat-
ment given the comparative law relative to limitation of actions exempli-
fies the authors' technique. It is pointed out that to the Roman lawyer
limitation of actions was one thing and the acquisition of ownership by
lapse of time quite another. The common law is not so logical. The
common law jurists seemed to have stumbled into the latter as a by-
product of the former, and for no apparent reason have confined this
mode of acquiring ownership to land, easements and the like. The
Roman system of limitation of actions is marked by what appears to the
modern student to be excessively long periods, being thirty years for
